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9. ‘Poetry and Biology: the Anatomy of Tragedy’ 
(Andrea Capra) 
The Poetics	may look like “un	bloc	erratique”, as Victor Goldshmidt once called it.1 In 
part, this depends on its strange isolation within the corpus, in that the Poetics, as we 
shall see, is not served by the abundant cross-references that help situate other works. To 
make things worse, in antiquity the Poetics was never the subject of a commentary, while 
Aristotle’s other works devoted to poetry were soon lost. By contrast, in modern times 
the relentless proliferation of non-philosophical readings has famously turned the Poetics 
into a handbook for playwrights or, more recently, into a historical/critical essay of sorts, 
thus severing it from Aristotle’s philosophical project. This complicated background has 
prompted a widespread “humanistic” approach to the Poetics, with a focus on Rhetoric 
and, more recently, on Politics and on the	Ethics.2 While emphasizing the relevance of 
these works to certain aspects of the Poetics, this chapter circumscribes their explanatory 
power. Unlike tragedy’s lesser constituents discussed in Poetics 6, Aristotle’s innovative 
notion of mythos, i.e. what is truly specific of poetry, proves to be hardly at home in the 
more “humanistic” areas of Aristotle’s thought. In search of an alternative path, I unravel 
the pre-Aristotelian premises that tacitly underlie what Malcolm Heath calls Aristotle’s 
“natural history of poetry”.3 Moreover, I survey certain templates of reasoning shared by 
Aristotelian poetics and biology, whose scientific twist, I argue, entails an unnoticed 
reference to Plato’s notion of poetic mythos, which in the course of Poetics comes to be 
superseded. In sum, this paper advances a novel two-level model, whereby the “lower” 
parts of the poetic art confirm the expected “humanistic” affiliation, whereas its pinnacle, 
namely the new notion of mythos, turns out to be the product of Aristotle’s biological 
thinking.	4 
                                                
1 Goldsmith 1982, 400. 
2 Cf. Ford 2015, 5. 
3 Heath 2013, 56-103 (see below). 
4 Needless to say, the suggestion that Aristotle’s approach to poetry is somewhat “biological” is 
occasionally found in scholarship, but on cursory and one-sided grounds, which has prompted 
harsh criticism (e.g. by Halliwell 1986, 97-98). The present paper aims to complement and 
expand the more nuanced position advanced by Ford 2002, 266 (“the organicism that Aristotle 
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1. The isolation of the Poetics 
Aristotle is usually fond of pointing to other works of his, thus creating a rich network of 
cross-references that help situate a given work within his “encyclopedia”.5 However, this 
is not the case with the Poetics: surprisingly, no general preface orientates the reader,6 
and references to Aristotle’s other works are few and frustratingly elusive. Let me briefly 
review them:7 
1) Po. 6.1449b21-28 “I shall discuss epic mimesis and comedy later (hysteron	eroumen). 
But let us deal with tragedy by taking up the definition of its essential nature which arises 
out of the things that have so far been said (ek	 tōn	 eirēmenōn). Tragedy, then, is a 
representation of an action which is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude - in 
language which is garnished in various forms in its different parts - in the mode of 
dramatic enactment, not narrative - and through the arousal of pity and fear effecting 
(perainousa) the catharsis of such emotions”. 
2) Po. 15.1454b15-18 “In addition to observing these points the poet must guard against 
contraventions of the perceptions which necessarily attach to poetic art, since there are 
many ways of making mistakes in relation to these. But I have discussed these matters 
adequately in my published writings (en	tois	ekdedomenois	logois)”. 
3) Po. 19.1456a33-b2: “Having discussed the other elements, it remains for me to discuss 
style and thought. The details of thought can be left to my discourses on rhetoric (en	tois	
peri	 rhētorikēs	 keisthō), since they belong more integrally to that subject. Thought 
pertains to all those effects which must be produced by the spoken language; its functions 
are demonstration, refutation, the arousal of emotions such as pity, fear, anger, and such 
like, and arguing for the importance or unimportance of things”. 
4) Po. 20.1456b31-4: “These sounds are distinguishable by the shape of the mouth, the 
points of contact, the presence or absence of the aspirate, length and shortness, and pitch-
accent (acute, grave, or intermediate): detailed consideration of all these points belongs to 
works on meter” (en	tois	metrikois	prosēkei	theōrein). 
                                                                                                                                            
took from Plato and adapted to his formal and teleological view of poetry gave poetic criticism 
something of the objectivity of anatomy”). 
5 For a useful list, see Bonitz 1870, s.v. Aristoteles, 95-105. 
6 Cf. e.g. Else 1957, 2. 
7 Translations from Aristotle’s Poetics are from Halliwell 1987. 
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Point one is a familiar and notorious riddle: by and large, the querelle about the existence 
of a second book of the Poetics stems from these words. Whatever we make of modern 
attempts at reconstructing it, no extant work of Aristotle corresponds to this reference, 
which in any case would be an internal one, pointing to another section of the Poetics 
itself. Point two is also tricky, but most scholars construe Aristotle’s words as a reference 
to his lost dialogue About	the	Poets. In the entire corpus, this is the only instance of the 
expression “published works” (ekdedomenoi	 logoi).8 However, the expression is found 
in a letter that Aristotle allegedly wrote to Alexander, containing the famous reference to 
his akroamatic writings and the distinction between published and unpublished works 
(Sixth	epistle). Point three is the clearest: this is an unequivocal reference to the Rhetoric, 
and I shall discuss it later. Point fourth, however, is very dubious. Aristotle’s words are 
vague and suspicious:9 they may refer to metrical matters or, as Stephen Halliwell 
translates them, to works on meter.10 But even if that were the case, it would be by no 
means certain Aristotle’s reference should point to his	own works. At any rate, we know 
nothing about metrical writings by Aristotle. 
 All in all, we are left with a single reference to another known work, and this is 
the Rhetoric. Let me note that the preference given to this work is, so to say, 
reciprocated, in that the Rhetoric features no fewer than five references to the Poetics.11 
First, Aristotle claims he has addressed the issue of laughter in the Poetics (Rh.	 I 
11.1372a1-3); second, he has also discussed style (lexis) there, albeit partially (Rh.	 III 
1.1404a37-9); third, he refers to nouns as a part of style he has discussed in the Poetics 
(Rh.	 III 2.1404b5-8); fourth he mentions metaphors as a subject more pertinent to the 
Poetics (Rh.	III 2.1405a3-6); fifth and last, he touches again on laughter and its divisions, 
which he claims he has discussed in the Poetics. The two references to laughter, of 
course, throw further fuel on the querelle about the second book of the Poetics. The other 
references tell us that style is something shared by poetry and rhetoric. This may not 
                                                
8 Cf. Tarán and Gutas 2012, 21-5, for the interpretation of this expression. 
9 Cf. e.g. Bywater 1909, 268: “The preposition [scil. en, followed by tois metrikois] has to be 
bracketed, as there is no hint of a book on metre, actual or contemplated, by Aristotle himself”. 
10 Halliwell 1987, 54. 
11 Cf. Tarán and Gutas 2012, 20, where a sixth reference is added (Rh. III 2.1404b26-8. The 
phrase en tois peri poiēseōs is likely to refer to the Poetics). 
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seem very helpful, but together with Aristotle’s citation of the Rhetoric in the Poetics, 
they may help pinpoint the specificity of poetry against speech as such: I will return to 
that later. 
 Apart from the five references in the Rhetoric, Aristotle cites the Poetics only 
another time, in an important passage towards the end of the Politics	 (Pol. VIII 
7.1341b32-45). Once again, the reference is baffling. Aristotle promises a clear 
discussion of catharsis in the Poetics, which is precisely what nobody has ever managed 
to find there.12 
2. The Politics 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, my survey results in a rather poor conclusion. Unless something 
can be made of Aristotle’s baffling promise in the Politics, all we learn is that thought 
(dianoia) and style (lexis) are common to poetry and speech: hardly a great achievement. 
The Poetics is in fact, at least prima	facie, an isolated work. At best, the Poetics	shares 
with the Rhetoric a reciprocal, if rather poor, consonance,13 but today hardly anyone 
would subscribe to Süß’s idea that Aristotle’s Poetics is “eine Ergänzung der 
Rhetoric”.14 What about the Politics, though? Does the Poetics “reciprocate”? The 
Poetics never mentions the Politics, so the answer should be in the negative. However, 
one interesting way to tackle the isolation of the Poetics lies precisely in an attempt to 
show that the Poetics, after all, does refer to the Politics. 
Let us get back to the catharsis passage, point one above. A few years ago, 
Pierluigi Donini has argued that this passage refers back to the Politics, which would 
provide the required “reciprocal” link to that work.15 In the light of a number of good 
parallels, Donini interprets the participle perainousa as meaning “to complete” rather 
than “to effect” and argues that in fact tragedy “completes” the musical catharsis as 
described in the Politics. Thus, he construes “the things that have been said” as a 
                                                
12 Nevertheless, a careful examination of this passage, albeit indirectly, can throw light on 
catharsis in the Poetics (cf. Heath 2014) and reveal at the same time a complex (dis)continuity 
with Plato’s notions of catharsis and ekplexis (cf. Ramfos 1992, 180-5). 
13 Ničev 1988 argues that at least nine key notions (eleos, phobos, epieikēs, homoios, bouleutikos, 
proairesis, diakaiosynē, hamartia, and doxa) provide a link between Poetics and Rhetoric. 
14 Süß 1910, 91, which I found quoted in Kraus 2005, 73. Kraus provides a clear discussion of the 
early tendency to associate Rhetoric and Poetics in the Aristotelian tradition. 
15 Donini 2008, CVII-CXIII, based on Donini 1998. 
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reference to the discussion of catharsis found in the Politics.	Donini argues that this work 
discusses the educational benefits of catharsis at an early age, so that tragedy can be 
construed as the crowning touch, the mature counterpart of that educational process. The 
emphasis is on the intellectual force of tragedy, and on the understanding that it requires 
from both audiences and readers. All of a sudden, this conclusion would break up the 
isolation of the Poetics, and poetry would return to be a social and political phenomenon, 
only at a more advanced and elitist level. 
	 Donini’s	solution	 is	very	tempting,	as	 it	would	solve	many	thorny	problems	
related	 to	catharsis.	Nevertheless,	 I	 think	 the	 temptation	 should	be	 resisted.	 I	will	
not	get	into	general	problems	such	as	the	role	of	catharsis	in	the	Politics,	where	the	
notion	 is	 first	 introduced	 as	 a	 therapy	 to	 cure	 abnormal	 emotions	 and	 is	
distinguished	 from	mathēsis	 (Pol.	VIII	 6.1341a21-4). I will limit myself to a remark 
about the expression found in the Poetics, namely “the things that have been said” (ek	
tōn	 eirēmenōn). At a formal level, a TLG survey of the almost 100 instances of this 
quasi-formulaic expression in Aristotle’s works would show that it refers	to	something	
found	in	the	proximities	of	the	text,	within	the	same	work,	as	is	immediately	clear	in	
the	 two	other	 instances	 found	 in	 the	Poetics	 (Po.	9.1451a36	 and	26.1461b24-5).16 
This seriously undermines Donini’s otherwise attractive interpretation. For my present 
purposes, it is safer to look elsewhere for links to other works of the corpus. 
3. The six parts of tragedy 
Despite the lack of explicit links to other works or to Aristotle’s philosophical project, ch. 
6, with its division of tragedy into its constitutive parts, offers a kind of “second sailing”, 
in the form of a few semi-explicit indications as to the place of the Poetics within 
Aristotle’s encyclopedia. Let us review tragedy’s six parts (Po.	6.1450a9-11)17: 
So then, tragedy as a whole must have six elements which make it what it is: they are 
plot-structure (mythos), character (ēthē), style (lexis), thought (dianoia), spectacle 
(opsis), song (melopoiia). 
To begin from the last and least important elements, one may claim that spectacle and 
song, at least potentially, can be read against Aristotle’s psychology: for example, one 
                                                
16 Rostagni 1945, ad locc., rightly stresses the point. 
17 On the order (“processive” as well as axiological) of tragedy’s six parts cf. Silk 1994. 
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would expect some reference to phantasia, be it from the point of view of the poet who 
“brings plots before his eyes” (Po.	17.1455a23-4) or from the standpoint of the readers, 
who presumably “process” poetry through visual as well as intellectual patterns. And yet 
Aristotle never mentions phantasia in the Poetics. What is more, when it comes to these 
two parts of tragedy Aristotle seems to make them, albeit in different degrees, external to 
poetics.18 Song and spectacle, then, provide no clear indication as to the place of the 
Poetics. 
Style and thought pop up in reverse order a few lines later, which makes them a 
whole of sorts. Both are crucially interwoven with rhetoric: as we have seen, in the 
Poetics Aristotle tells us that the “details of thought” are discussed in the Rhetoric, 
whereas in the Rhetoric	he says that many aspects of style, such as metaphors and names, 
are discussed in the Poetics. Style and thought have to do with both poetry and prose, and 
this is why they feature in Aristotle’s two relevant works. The connection with the 
Rhetoric, then, ranges from explicit to quasi-explicit.  
To this rather obvious fact, one may add that the couple formed by thought and 
style in the middle of Aristotle’s list points to an implicit anti-Platonic tenet.19 As we 
hear in the Gorgias, poetry is in fact garnished speech. If one were to strip tragedy of its 
spectacular and musical garnishing, “naked” poetry would prove to be nothing more than 
speech (Grg. 502c). But Aristotle’s “style”, at least in part, is integral to poetry regardless 
of its garnishing, the most obvious example being metaphors, which are specific and 
intrinsic to poetry. 
Character, “the element which reveals the nature of a moral choice”, has an 
obvious counterpart in Aristotle’s ethical works as well as in the Politics, given that the 
relationship of the latter with the Ethics, although notoriously complicated, is very strong. 
Let us not forget, moreover, the importance of the ethical and political dimension of 
                                                
18  This is suggested by the tone of the passage, which sounds dismissive and rules out 
performance as a crucial constituent of poetics: “Of the remaining elements, lyric poetry is the 
most important of garnishings, while spectacle is emotionally powerful but is the least integral of 
all to the poet’s art: for the potential of tragedy does not depend upon public performance and 
actors; and, besides, the art of the mask-maker carries more weight than the poet’s as regards the 
elaboration of visual effects” (Po. 6.1450b15-20). 
19  Despite the palpable anti-Platonic import of many arguments developed in the Poetics, 
Aristotle “seems to be avoiding a direct confrontation with his opponent” (Nehamas 1992, 291). 
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thought. As one critic puts it, “in the Nicomachean	Ethics the distinction between ethos 
and dianoia is central to Aristotle’s theory and plays a structural role in its 
elaboration”.20 Thought is also political in character, given that - so runs Aristotle’s 
definition - “thought is the capacity to produce pertinent and appropriate arguments, 
which is the task in prose speeches of the arts of politics and rhetoric” (Po.	6.1450b5-7). 
This amounts to a semi-explicit reference to the Politics and the Rhetoric. 
4. Ethics, Rhetoric and Politics: poetry and the endoxa. 
Before addressing mythos, the first and far most important part of tragedy, let us pause 
for a moment. As we have seen, the second, third and fourth most important parts of 
tragedy provide (semi-)explicit links to Rhetoric, Politics and the Ethics. A similar 
conclusion emerges from another crucial constituent of tragedy: as Dana Munteanu has 
argued, tragedy’s oikeia	 hēdonē is best explained through pleasure as discussed in 
Nicomachean	 Ethics 10 and through memory and mourning as discussed in the 
Rhetoric.21 By and large, all of this points to what can be construed as the area of the 
“humanities” within Aristotle’s encyclopedia. This humanistic “affiliation” of poetry is of 
course natural for us moderns and to some extent it holds for Aristotle too,22 especially at 
a time when “a view of Aristotle as a hard-core empiricist has given way to a picture of a 
humanist who is attuned to the nuances of his cultural milieu”.23 To what extent, though? 
At first sight, such an “affiliation” may be confirmed by examining the role of 
poetry in Aristotle’s rhetorical, political and ethical works. Quotations from poetry and 
from poetic plots are ubiquitous and of paramount importance: poetry can be seen as the 
product of wise men but, more importantly, is consistent with common sense. In other 
words, poems, “almost invariably stripped of their performative context”,24 are seen as a 
vivid digest of endoxa, and as such they play a crucial dialectical role in any practical 
                                                
20 Blundel 1992, 156. This article provides a lucid discussion of the relationship between the 
Poetics and Aristotle’s ethical and political work as regards ethos and dianoia. Kraus 2005 
explores the intersections between Rhetoric and Poetics as regards ethos. 
21 Munteanu 2011, ch. 4. 
22 Belfiore 1992 explores the issue in depth. Young 1983 notes a number of striking parallels 
between the Poetics and Pindar’s reflections on poetry. 
23 Haskins 2004, 1. 
24 Haskins 2004, 8. 
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argument.25 As a consequence, most of the issues discussed in the ethical, rhetorical and 
political works can be hardly conceived of outside the frame of poetry. 
 Poetry, then, works as a kind of vivid repository of common sense, refined 
through the centuries. Far from being a shortcoming, this feature makes poetry a shortcut 
to endoxa: an invaluable dialectical tool, then. This being the case, one may begin to 
doubt that such an approach to poetry can be always construed as humanistic in our 
sense, and yet no conclusion is possible before we analyze the top item in Aristotle’s list, 
namely mythos. Before we touch on the new meaning that this word is given in the 
Poetics, it may be useful to remark how Aristotle uses the word to attack other figures of 
the Greek tradition: in the De	generatione	animalium he claims that “even the fishermen 
repeat the same simple tale, so much noised abroad, as does Herodotus the mythologist 
(mythologos), as if fish were conceived by the mother’s swallowing the milt” (GA III. 
5.756b5-8). 
Here, as in many other cases, Aristotle uses myth as a polemical weapon, much 
like the historians themselves when they attack the poets.26 Remarkably, this usage of the 
word mythos and of its cognates is by far the commonest in Aristotle’s works other than 
the Poetics, and even the famous passage of the Metaphysics (Metaph. I 2.982b11-21) 
where Aristotle suggests that “lovers of myths” are in a way philosophers can be seen in 
this light: qua mysterious and marvelous, myth fuels curiosity and urges people to ask 
questions and solve problems. In other words, myth is good to the extent that 
philosophers can supersede it and explain it away, as is the case in the passage from the 
De	generatione	animalium. 
To summarize: tragedy is the most important form of poetry, and mythos is the 
most important part of tragedy. And yet mythos does not mean “myth”, as elsewhere in 
Aristotle, but is something like plot or intelligible structure: as Michael Silk puts it “in 
Aristotle’s special meaning” mythos is “a formal entity”.27 The novelty is signaled by the 
                                                
25 Cf. Guastini 2010, 16-22. 
26 Cf. Saïd 2007. 
27 Silk 2001, 175. 
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phrase “I define myth” (legō	gar	mython, Po.	6.1450a4).28 The new meaning, which is 
surely related with the anti-Platonic idea that poetry imitates actions rather than 
characters, seems to be by and large unparalleled and has been construed as proto-
narratological. 29  What is truly specific of poetry, then, cannot be found in the 
“humanistic” areas of Aristotle’s thought, nor is his frequent resort to poetry in political, 
ethical and rhetorical works “humanistic” in our sense. All in all, we are facing a strange 
paradox. Where does the unprecedented meaning of mythos in the Poetics come from? 
5. Poetics and Biology. 
Sometimes, paradoxes call for paradoxical explanations. Within Aristotle’s encyclopedia, 
the one area where poetry and the poets seem to play no significant role is biology. This 
is true as regards the early Historia	animalium, and is even truer if we turn to Aristotle’s 
mature biological works. 30 Could it be the case, then, that poetic mythos, along with 
other surprising features of the Poetics, can be understood in the light of Aristotle’s 
biology? Malcolm Heath’s Ancient	 Philosophical	 Poetics features an entire chapter 
entitled “The natural history of poetry: Aristotle”.31 Heath’s discussion provides a very 
convenient framework for my own argument. 
 As Heath remarks, Aristotle “thinks biologically” in a number of ways, and the 
same can be proven true in the case of the Poetics. In particular, Heath shows that 
Aristotle’s hierarchical conception of kinds, although it is part of a non-evolutionary 
conception of nature, closely parallels the development of poetry described in the Poetics, 
                                                
28 On the meaning of mythos in the Poetics, and its modern interpretations cf. Frazier 2013, with 
ample bibliography. 
29 Cf. Zimmermann 2009. Belfiore 2000 rightly points out the distance between Aristotle’s 
cultural assumptions and those found in modern narratology, with its emphasis on fiction and on 
the characters’ psychology. Fusillo 1986 cautiously compares Aristotelian mythos and 
narratological récit, and rightly stresses how the meaning of the word oscillates in the Poetics 
from the least to the most specific, as in Aristotle’s explicit “definition”. The technical meaning, 
though predominant, should be envisaged as just one extreme of a spectrum, the other being 
represented by the traditional meaning(s). I thank Dana Munteanu for attracting my attention to 
the nuances of Aristotle’s use of mythos in the Poetics. 
30 This is not to say that there are no poetic quotations in Aristotle’s biological works. On the 
contrary, Homeric lines abound in the HA. However, “none is tightly integrated to the context in 
which it appears … Most of the Homer-references could well be excerpts from somewhere else – 
information plucked from another source, in which they are a much better fit” (Mayhew 2015, 
131). 
31 Heath 2013, 56-103. Cf. also Rees 1981, with added bibliography. 
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which has eventually given birth to its most perfect and “natural” product, namely 
tragedy. Accordingly, Heath can plausibly say, for example, that iambus is defective 
relative to more perfect and recent forms of poetry just as - say - inferior species are 
defective relative to superior species in Aristotle’s biology. 
I fully agree with this view. Let me only add that, in this specific case, Aristotle’s 
tendency to “think biologically” found fertile ground in a still more general tendency of 
Greek thought. I am thinking of phenomena such as the structural function of certain 
myths and narratives: diachronic narration could work as a device to highlight a 
synchronic taxonomy, as is clear, for example, in the myth of Prometheus and the animal 
species in Plato’s Protagoras.32 Also, it is interesting to note that space and time are 
often two interchangeable dimensions: myth, that is the events of the age of the 
demigods, is the stuff tragedies are usually made of. When that is not the case, as it 
happens with Aeschylus’ Persians or Phrynicus’ Capture	of	Miletus, myth is replaced by 
a fabulous setting: both tragedies are set in far off Persia, governed by a semi-divine king, 
as Xerxes and Darius are described by Aeschylus. The idea is nicely captured, many 
centuries later, by Plutarch, who begins the Life	of	Theseus by saying that myth is out of 
map boundaries for the historian just like faraway and fabulous lands are out of map 
boundaries in geographical terms, with a telling conflation of space and time. 
Finally, Greek religion - and here I am referring to the whole set of stories of the 
Gods prior to the kingdom of Zeus - suggests that the opposition between evolutionary 
and non-evolutionary models, however natural it may seem to us, is not exhaustive. 
Tertium	datur: the gods were born and had to struggle to become what they are, but once 
they have reached their perfect and final stage, they are “frozen” forever, and no further 
change, either political or biological, will ever occur.33 
	 These typically Greek patterns of thought help explain why Aristotle ended up 
construing two very different phenomena such as poetry and biology through one and the 
same theoretical frame, whereby synchrony and diachrony, space and time easily merge. 
On the one hand, this occasionally leads Aristotle to speak of nature as if it were the 
result of a process: nature “proceeds” (metabainei) from species to species (e.g. HA VIII 
                                                
32 Cf. e.g. Brisson 1975. 
33 Cf. e.g. Graziosi and Haubold 2005, ch. 3. 
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1.588b4 and PA IV 5.681a12). On the other hand, conversely, poetry does evolve through 
time, and yet Aristotle’s “narrative” ultimately amounts to a static taxonomy, which is the 
product of what Aristotle seems to construe as an impersonal and - let me stress it - 
natural necessity, where the individual poets play a totally marginal role.34 Evolutionary 
time and taxonomical space are interchangeable and can be both described as a 
movement or progression. All in all, the fact that poetry - unlike Aristotelian biology - 
has emerged through time seems to be irrelevant for Aristotle. 
6. Biological templates of reasoning: the redemption of the ugly 
In this and in the next paragraph I will further pursue the analogy between Aristotelian 
biology and poetics, before addressing, in my final paragraph, the crucial issue of 
mythos. How can we define the format and features of such analogies? Let me borrow a 
viable method from Stephen Halliwell’s Between	Ecstasy	and	Truth.35 Halliwell stresses 
the continuity between such areas as poetics, ethics, politics and psychology in Aristotle’s 
discussion of poetry. To this effect, among other things, he makes the following point: 
Now it is clearly the case that, for Aristotle, ethical judgment must always take account 
of the identity of the agent, the circumstances, the aim of the action, etc. We find him 
expressly invoking such variables in his own ethical writings. When specifying, for 
instance, in book 3 of the Nicomachean	Ethics, the factors which can make an action 
‘involuntary’ … he lists all the possible objects of a person’s ignorance: ‘who he is, what 
he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, what instrument he is using, and to what end’ 
(EN III 1.1111a3-5). Although in this passage Aristotle is speaking of an agent’s own 
knowledge or ignorance, the close match between the set of terms used here and those 
adduced in Poetics 25 shows that in the latter he is thinking with, so to speak, a template 
of reasoning which he has carried over from his ethical philosophy in general (p. 217-8, 
emphasis mine). 
This suggests a conveniently flexible level where to look for analogies, namely 
“templates of reasoning”, complete with lexical matches. I will focus on a couple of 
biological “templates” that Aristotle arguably applied to the Poetics. 
                                                
34 For a radically different view, see Kyriakou 1993. 
35 Halliwell 2011. 
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 The first template I want to discuss may be called “the redemption of the ugly”, 
and is best exemplified in a deservedly famous passage from the Parts	of	animals (PA I 
5.645a4-15): 
Having already treated of the celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we 
proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best of our ability, any member of the 
kingdom, however ignoble (atimoteron). For if some have no graces to charm the sense, 
yet even these, by disclosing to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that designed 
them, give immense pleasure to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to 
philosophy. Indeed, it would be strange if mimic representations of them were attractive 
(tas men eikonas autōn theōrountes chairomen), because they disclose the mimetic skill 
of the painter or sculptor, and the original realities themselves were not more interesting, 
to all at any rate who have eyes to discern the reasons that determined their formation 
(transl. W. Ogle). 
I agree with Andrew Ford and Pierluigi Donini that this passage is relevant to the Poetics, 
although neither poetry nor tragedy are mentioned.36 The whole train of thought calls to 
mind - irresistibly I would say - chapter 4 of the Poetics, where Aristotle discusses the 
pleasure inherent to imitation: 
For we take pleasure in contemplating the most precise images of things (tas eikonas … 
chairomen theōrountes) whose sight in itself causes us pain - such as the appearance of 
the basest (atimotatōn) animals, or of corpses. Here too the explanation lies in the fact 
that great pleasure is derived from exercising the understanding, not just for philosophers 
but in the same way for all men, though their capacity for it may be limited” (Po. 
4.1448b10-15) 
I would only add that a close examination of Aristotle’s lexical choices, as should be 
clear from the Greek words in brackets, reinforces the idea. 
Unlike “base animals” per se, the contemplation of which is the privilege of the 
philosophers, the images of base animals can give pleasure to both common people and 
philosophers. The reaction of the former possibly implies the kind of detachment 
                                                
36 Cf. Ford 2002, 266-8; Ford 2015, 15-16; Donini 2008, CIV. 
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provided by phantasia:37 as we hear in the De	Anima, “when we merely imagine (kata	
tēn	phantasian) we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of 
some dreadful or encouraging scene” (de	 An. III 3.427b23-4).38 Only philosophers, 
however, are capable of theoretical contemplation. The philosopher’s analysis of tragic 
plots is not performed through phantasia, which is shared by all men and many animals. 
Rather, it calls to mind the “intellectual perception” (aisthēsis	 kata	 tēn	 theōrian) 
referred to in the passage from the Parts	of	animals, which is why, I submit, Aristotelian 
criticism may be said to grant its practitioners “a supervenient pleasure … one that goes 
beyond our enthrallment by the work or our admiration for the artist’s technique”.39 In 
doing so, the contemplating philosophers may be called “biologists of art”, or “biologists 
of poetry”, given that Aristotle resorts to painting as a minimal model for the 
consumption of poetry.40 
7. Biological templates of reasoning: synopsy vs haphazardness 
The second template may be called “synopsy versus haphazardness”, and is in fact 
closely related to the first one. This time, let me start from the Poetics, chapters 7 and 24: 
Any beautiful object, whether an animal (zōon) or any other structure of parts, must 
possess not only ordered arrangement but also a non-haphazard (mē	to	tychon) scale (for 
beauty is grounded in both size and order). An animal (zōon) could not be beautiful if it 
is either too small - for perception of it is practically instantaneous and so cannot be 
experienced - or too great, for contemplation of it cannot be a single experience, and it is 
not possible to derive a sense of unity and wholeness from our perception of it (imagine 
an animal - zōon - a thousand miles long). Just, therefore, as regards beautiful bodies or 
animals (zōōn) there must be some size, but one which allows it to be perceived all 
together, so mythoi should be of a length which can be easily held in the memory (Po.	
7.1450b34-1451a6). 
                                                
37 Cf. Palumbo 2008, 502-3, suggesting that phantasia is implicit in this passage. 
38 It should be noted, however, that phantasia does not necessarily result in a form of detachment, 
as is clear in the case of animals (cf. Nussbaum 1978, 212ff.). The exponential growth of works 
devoted to Aristotle’s phantasia seems to be positively related, among other things, to its baffling 
complexity and apparent inconsistency. Recent monographs include Astolfi 2011, with a useful 
status quaestionis, and Feola 2012, a lucid and meticulous discussion of phantasia in De Anima. 
39 Ford 2015, 16. 
40 Cf. Zanker 2000. 
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As for the narrative art of mimesis in spoken verse, it is evident that its mythoi should 
have a dramatic coherence, just as in tragedy, and that they should concern an action 
which is unitary and complete (with beginning, middle and end), so that, as with a living 
animal (zōon), the single and entire structure may yield the pleasure which belongs to it. 
The corollary of this is that poetic organization (syntheseis) should not resemble 
histories, in which one need not find the exposition of a unitary action but of all the 
events which, at a given time, happened to one or more persons, in such a way that the 
reciprocal connection of the events is haphazard (hos	etychen) … and this is one respect 
in which Homer’s inspired superiority is evident, because of his refusal to attempt to 
make a plot about the entire war … such a mythos would be too bulky, and could not be 
perceived as a unity; or, if moderate in size, would be too intricately detailed (Po.	
23.1459a17-34). 
These passages provide an interesting confirmation: works of poetry can be construed as 
animals, whose structure - provided it is perceivable as a unity - is bound to give pleasure 
to rational observers. This repeated comparison with animals calls to mind the famous 
passage of Plato’s Phaedrus in which speeches are equated to animals that only a good 
butcher can cut up properly so as to respect their internal structure (Phdr. 265a). In fact, 
structure is crucial to Aristotle as well, and to this effect poems should not be too 
“bulky”, Homer being a kind of surprising and happy exception.41 
If we now move to the observation of “real” animals, it may be interesting to note 
that Aristotle, time and again, insists that in order for their structure to be fully visible a 
given animal should not be too small - embryos under a certain age have an 
undistinguishable structure (HA VII 3.583b9-11) - or too fat. For example, in the third 
book of the Historia	animalium he says the following: 
For the veins have the shape of the entire body, like a sketch of a mannequin (en	tois	
graphomenois	konabois); in such a way that the whole frame seems to be filled up with 
little veins in attenuated subjects-for the space occupied by flesh in fat individuals is 
filled with little veins in thin ones-whereas the sinews are distributed about the joints and 
the flexures of the bones. Now, if the sinews were derived in unbroken sequence from a 
                                                
41 And Aristotle being not especially consistent when he addresses the issue of mēkos and 
megethos in the Poetics: see Belfiore 2001. 
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common point of departure, this continuity would be discernible in attenuated specimens 
(HA III 5.515a34-b6, transl. D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson). 
This and other similar passages are crucial in that, groundbreakingly, the notion of 
biological system emerges: it is not the single organs or parts that count, but their 
complex organization, forming a continuum.	42 
From this point of view, of great interest is also Aristotle’s emphasis on “poetic 
organization” (synthesis) as something that should be kept carefully distinct from the 
haphazard events that form the raw material of history. This calls to mind what follows in 
the passage from the Parts	of	animals I quoted earlier: 
Absence of haphazard (tychontōs) and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be 
found in Nature’s works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations 
and combinations is a form of the beautiful. If any person thinks the examination of the 
rest of the animal kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of 
man. For no one can look at the primordia of the human frame-blood, flesh, bones, 
vessels, and the like-without much repugnance. Moreover, when any one of the parts or 
structures, be it which it may, is under discussion, it must not be supposed that it is its 
material composition to which attention is being directed or which is the object of the 
discussion, but the relation of such part to the total form. Similarly, the true object of 
architecture is not bricks, mortar, or timber, but the house; and so the principal object of 
natural philosophy is not the material elements, but their composition, and the totality of 
the form (peri tēs syntheseōs kai tēs holes ousias), independently of which they have no 
existence (PA I 5.645a23-36 transl. W. Ogle). 
In both poetry and biology, synthesis as opposed to haphazardness is the key to make 
sense of things. Even though synthesis is not identical with body system, it is clear that 
the two notions are very close, and they both depend on soul as defined a few pages 
earlier in the Parts of the Animals: “and inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that 
                                                
42 On Aristotle’s “invention” of biological systems in the Parts of Animals (cf. PA II 2.647b18-9, 
II 3.650a2-8, II 9.654a32-b3, II 9.655b2-21) see Lanza and Vegetti 1971, 543. Aristotle, however, 
remains “fedele come sempre nella sua biologia al linguaggio comune” which is why he does not 
feel the need to work out “nuovi termini atti a fissure con precision l’acquisita consapevolezza 
teorica” (ibidem). 
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enables matter to constitute the animal nature, much more than it is the presence of matter 
which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound on every ground to treat of the 
soul rather than of the matter. For though the wood of which they are made constitutes 
the couch and the tripod, it only does so because it is capable of receiving such and such 
a form” (PA I 1.641a27-32). 
8. Mythos and the soul of tragedy: towards a biological reading 
With synthesis and soul, pointing to the implicit notion of biological system, my 
argument comes full circle, in that they correspond precisely to the above-mentioned 
attempt at definition (legō gar mython), which is in fact the only explicit one found in the 
Poetics: 
By this term mythos I mean the organisation of the events (synthesin tōn pragmatōn)… 
(Po. 6.1450a4-5) 
The idea is further developed a few lines later: 
And so, the mythos is the first principle and, so to speak, the soul of tragedy, while 
characterization is the element of second importance. (An analogous point holds for 
painting: a random distribution of the most attractive colours would never yield as much 
pleasure as a black-and-white sketch) (Po. 6.1450a38-b4). 
The biological image implicit in these words seems to leap off the page: as early as 1895 
Samuel Butcher pointed out that Aristotle’s biological works provide the appropriate 
parallels to understand the equation of mythos and soul correctly.43 However, we are now 
in a position to construe biologically the entire passage, including the by now familiar 
comparison with painting and the emphasis on a clear sketch: just remember the “sketch 
of a mannequin” referred to in the passage from the Historia animalium quoted above, 
when Aristotle discusses veins. 
Needless to say, I do not contend that biology is the only key to interpret 
Aristotle’s quasi-definition of mythos, as the shared templates may depend in part on 
Aristotle’s more general assumptions. Yet, whatever the extent of essentialism in 
Aristotle’s biology, his biological works feature what may be cautiously labeled a 
                                                
43 Butcher 1895, 320-321. 
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“scientific” approach, which is specific to them.44 The parallels between the Poetics and 
these works, supported as they are by textual matches, suggest that Aristotle was 
“thinking biologically” when he devised his unprecedented notion of mythos.45 
It should be noted that the “Aristotelian” meaning of mythos does not emerge 
immediately in the Poetics. The very beginning of the work, I think, has a strange 
Platonic flavor.46 Aristotle wants to explore its force and the organization of mythoi, 
something that is crucial for the success of poetry (Po. 1.1447a9-10 πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι 
τοὺς µύθους εἰ µέλλει καλῶς ἕξειν ἡ ποίησις). This closely recalls the beginning of the 
Phaedo, where Socrates devises a kind of poetics in miniature, when he states that mythos 
is crucial for the very definition of poetry (Phd. 61b ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ 
µέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν µύθους and cf. Phd. 60c µῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι). Yet Socrates 
is speaking of poetic images, and he exemplifies this traditional meaning of mythos 
through Aesop. By contrast, the following chapters of the Poetics take leave of old myth 
and of Aesop’s speaking animals. 
An ultimately anti-Platonic notion of mythos seems to emerge, as Aristotle firmly 
places mythoi in a “scientific”, quasi-biological context.47 In Aristotle’s world, Aesop’s 
animals are replaced by the dissected corpses that formed the empirical basis of 
Aristotle’s zoology. This made possible the “invention” of body systems paralleled by 
that of structural plots (mythoi), which he construes as the soul (psychē) of tragedy. In 
this respect, it may be interesting to note that Plato’s Phaedrus, from which Aristotle 
seems to have borrowed the analogy between plays and animals, unfavorably contrasts 
written works with their “living and animate” (zōn kai empsychos) counterpart, i.e. with 
oral logos (Phdr. 276a). The implication is that written works can be construed as dead 
images. This adds to the parallel between Aristotle’s biological and literary researches: as 
                                                
44 See e.g. Gill 2011. 
45 Rees 1981, 26-7, makes a similar point. 
46 Gilead 1994 has an entire chapter on “The Phaedo in the light of Aristotle’s Poetics” (109-27), 
though this point is never actually addressed. In the Conclusion of Capra 2014, I explore the 
implications of the surprising similarities between the beginnings of Aristotle’s Poetics and 
Plato’s Phaedo. For a general comparison between Aristotelian and Platonic mythos, cf. Frazier 
2013. 
47 On the anti-Platonic import of Aristotelian mythos in the Poetics, see Belfiore 1992, 85-6 and 
Sissa 2006, 80. 
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I will suggest in a moment, the empirical basis of the latter, much like that of the former, 
is in a sense formed by corpses. 
Was Aristotle entirely original in his biological reading of poetry? Perhaps not, if 
we listen for a moment to Aristophanes’ Euripides in the underworld setting of the Frogs 
(Ra. 860-2): 
I am ready … to bite into the poetry, the songs, the sinews of tragedy (ta neura tēs 
tragōidias) 
Intriguingly, Euripides’ proto-biological analysis is a sort of autopsy, as both he and 
Aeschylus are dead. The death of (great) tragedy possibly explains why Dyonisus, at the 
beginning of the play, resorts to the highly unusual practice of “reading to himself” 
Euripides (Ra. 52-4). However, Aristophanes’ Euripides is performing on stage and, 
more importantly, he is joking, as is Dyonisus. Even more importantly, the Frogs 
envisages the (wishful) resurrection and reintegration of great tragedy into the 
community. By contrast, Aristotle had no such dreams and was content – so to speak – 
with the corpses.48 According to the Vita Marciana, he was nicknamed “the Mind” and 
“the Reader”, presumably for his wholly serious habit of reading books to himself.49 In 
fact, the Poetics often claims or implies that tragedy can be fully appreciated by mere 
reading “as well” (kai) (Po. 6.1450b18, 14.1453b4-7, 26.1462a11-17), regardless of its 
actual performance and social context, and this has major consequences on his 
understanding of poetry.50 
                                                
48 Dupont 2007, 74, goes so far as to argue that the man of Stageira, in accordance with the 
policies of the Macedonian kings, had the intention of “détruire le théâtre comme institution, car 
elle identifiait la cité d’Athènes”. 
49 Cf. Trabattoni 2005, 139-42, for a perceptive discussion of this interesting testimony. Cf. also 
Vegetti 1996, 75-77 for Aristotle’s tendency of “reading” the animal body as a text. 
50 Lanza 1987, 74-83, offers a particularly illuminating discussion. One may object that all three 
passages feature an introductory kai, which English translators usually render with “even”. 
Needless to say, kai can mean anything from “also” to “even” (cf. LSJ. Interestingly, modern 
Greek has akoma kai to distinguish the latter from the former). In my opinion, however, Aristotle 
is not saying that tragedy can be appreciated “even” without performance, as if reading were a 
pis-aller. Rather, kai is likely to mean something like “equally well”. Presumably, reading is 
Aristotle’s usual way to access 5th-Century drama, and although he shows some sensitivity to 
performance issues it is important for him to stress he is in a position to appreciate it no less fully 
than 5th-Century spectators. This is especially clear at Po. 26.1462a12-13, as Aristotle claims that 
tragedy and its qualities are conspicuous (phanera opoia tis estin) through reading. A few lines 
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Here, too, Aristotle may be said to be thinking biologically. His anatomical turn 
led him to disregard the behavior and the habitat of animals, which were still prominent 
in the Historia Animalium, and to devote his later biological work to the study of organic 
structures in isolation from their environment.51 Similarly, he ended up analyzing 5th-
Century tragedy as a dead corpse, in isolation from her performative and ritual 
environment. By dissecting rather than resurrecting her, and by privileging the forms of 
tragedy over the individual plays and the personality of their authors, Aristotle studied 
her anatomy and possibly invented literature as opposed to living performance. 52 
Contrary to the more or less tacit assumptions of modern scholars, however, the invention 
of literature was hardly a “humanistic” achievement. 
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